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Over the years, there has been an increase in the importance
and prevalence of the joint authorship doctrine resulting from the
internet evolution and globalization processes which allow quick
sharing of content and information among various creators from
around the world. The collaborations that increased and intensified
during the COVID-19 pandemic occurred across a wide variety of
creative areas. Today, many types of works such as songs, movies,
software, and computer games are created regularly through joint
authorship. However, current copyright law regimes relate to this
complex and fascinating phenomenon in a limited way, leading to
courts’ inconsistent interpretation of the doctrine’s tests.
The joint authorship doctrine relies on one primary collaborative model, the “all-or-nothing” model, which conditions the granting of joint authorship on authors making similar contributions to a
work. In the beginning of the twenty-first century, the English legal
system began recognizing asymmetrical contributions of joint
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authors and responded by rewarding them proportionally on the basis of each author’s contribution to the work. However, both models
ignore other types of contributions, such as those of ideas, participation in mass collaborative models, and the contribution of experts’ technical knowledge. Disregarding these types of contributions may reduce the incentive of creators to collaborate—one of the
central challenges of the joint authorship doctrine. This disincentive
to collaborate requires reexamination of the joint authorship doctrine. Despite the extensive legal literature suggesting it is essential
to comprehensively modify the joint authorship doctrine, there is a
great need to introduce a better model for determining joint authorship.
This article introduces a new approach to joint authorship, employing theoretical and empirical tools, in an attempt to better address the joint authors’ expectations from the collaborative process
and the allocation of rights. The theoretical discussion will include
a doctrinal analysis of joint authorship and the different requirements necessary to recognize this doctrine in the English and US
legal systems. The empirical portion will explore individuals’ perceptions regarding joint authorship using quantitative tools. For the
first time, the empirical research will test the allocation of rights in
the “all-or-nothing” model as compared to the “proportional”
model. The results demonstrate that a proportional allocation of
rights, as sorted by the English legal system, will grant economic
rights to joint authors in a greater number of cases. Additionally,
the empirical research will show that, in some cases, remuneration
should be divided proportionally between joint authors, even when
the contribution is not copyrightable, such as with ideas or technical
assistance.
The primary goal of this Article is to suggest an innovative
model that provides a comprehensive normative solution to the challenges raised by existing models of the joint authorship doctrine. In
addition, this Article seeks to provide greater certainty regarding
the reward distribution among authors within the joint authorship
context. Grounded in theoretical and empirical results, this model
aspires to provide joint authors with rights and royalties in a proportionate and just manner—namely, by accurately accounting for
each author’s contributions to the final work.
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This model, which is based on a structured scale, will assist
courts and joint authors in accurately assigning the relative portion
of the work that each author contributed. In general, this scale helps
to divide the joint authors’ world into three main categories: the
“primary joint author,” the “secondary joint author,” and the “de
minimis contributor.” The primary joint author appears at the top
of the scale and would be entitled to an equal share of the rights in
the joint work. The secondary joint author, whose contribution is
copyrightable yet relatively smaller than that of the primary joint
authors, should be entitled to a relative share of the rights. Finally,
the de minimis contributor, whose contribution is not copyrightable,
may be granted only a moral right (credit or acknowledgment) in
the joint work.
In summary, by focusing on preserving the incentive of joint authors to create collaborative works, this Article aspires to propose
a new, innovative model that promotes a distinct and feasible way
to allocate joint authorship rights to better reward such authors.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the years, there has been an increase in the importance and
prevalence of the joint authorship doctrine. This is due to the internet’s evolution and globalization processes which allow creators to
share content and information throughout the world, both quickly
and easily. These collaborations, which have recently increased and
intensified during the COVID-19 pandemic, occur constantly in a
wide variety of creative areas.1 Today, many types of works, such
as songs, movies, software, and computer games are created on a
regular basis through joint authorship.2 However, current copyright
law regimes relate to this complex and fascinating phenomenon in a

1

Brenda Maher & Richard Van Noorden, The Challenges Facing Research
Collaborations, 594 NATURE 316 (2021), https://media.nature.com/original/magazineassets/d41586-021-01570-2/d41586-021-01570-2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W4V6-9E88];
Standing on the Shoulders of Crowds, 594 NATURE 301 (2021),
https://media.nature.com/original/magazine-assets/d41586-021-01581-z/d41586-02101581-z.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5GJ-Q6BC]; E. Sachini et al., COVID-19 Enabled Coauthoring Networks: A Country-case Analysis, 126 SCIENTOMETRICS 5225, 5233 (2021)
(“While science has been a global collaborative endeavour, COVID-19 only increased this
trend.”).
2
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Copyright Trust, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1015,
1016 (2014) (“But in the real world, many copyright assets—and perhaps the vast majority
of the commercially valuable ones—result from the efforts of more than one contributor.
Indeed, in certain copyright domains, such as cinema, software, and games, all works
emanate from the labor of multiple individuals as a matter of course.”).
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limited way, leading to inconsistent interpretations of the doctrine’s
tests among courts.3
The joint authorship doctrine relies on one main collaborative
model, the “all-or-nothing” model, which conditions joint authorship on the authors’ similar contributions to a work.4 In the early
twenty-first century, the English legal system began to recognize
asymmetrical contributions of joint authors and rewarded them proportionally based on their contribution to the work.5 However, both
models ignore other types of contributions, such as the contribution
of ideas and the contribution of technical knowledge of experts.6
Disregarding these contributions may reduce creators’ incentive to
collaborate—a central challenge in the joint authorship context.
Therefore, this challenge prompts a reexamination of the joint authorship doctrine. Despite the extensive legal literature suggesting
the benefits of comprehensively modifying the doctrine, there

3

Lior Zemer, Contribution and Collaboration in Joint Authorship: Too Many
Misconceptions, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L & PRAC. 283, 285 (2006) (“What exactly constitutes
sufficient contribution is a complex issue, fraught with conflicting interpretations.”); see
also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Unplanned Coauthorship, 100 VA. L. REV. 1683, 1700
(2014) (“Yet in one form or the other, courts across the country have eliminated all three
options as viable candidates in understanding the nature of the intention required for
unplanned coauthorship.”).
4
Benjamin E. Jaffe, Rebutting the Equality Principle: Adapting the Co-Tenancy Law
Model to Enhance the Remedies Available to Joint Copyright Owners, 32 CARDOZO L. REV.
1549, 1550 (2011) (“[I]t creates an “on-off” switch that places significant weight on the
determination of joint authorship. A party who has made contributions to a work but who
has failed to contract is either deemed a joint author with a one-half interest in the work,
or is left without any ownership interest and is limited to unjust enrichment remedies.”).
5
See, e.g., Martin v. Kogan [2019] EWCA (Civ) 1645, [53] (Eng.); Fisher v. Brooker
[2006] EWHC (Ch) 3239, [98] (Eng.)
6
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work.”). See, e.g., Martin v. Kogan [2017] EWHC (IPEC)
2927, [78] (UK) (“I find that Ms. Kogan’s contributions as sole writer of the text of the
Screenplay were limited to suggestions of technical musical language, with which she was
undoubtedly more familiar than was Mr. Martin.”); Fylde Microsystems Ltd v. Key Radio
Systems Ltd [1998] FSR 449 (Ch) at 450 (“Although the contributions made by the
defendant’s employees were extensive and technically sophisticated and had involved the
expenditure of considerable time and effort they did not amount to contributions to the
authoring of the software and the defendant’s assertion of joint authorship failed.”).
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remains a great need for a better model for determining joint authorship.
This Article introduces a new approach to joint authorship, employing theoretical and empirical tools to better address joint authors’ expectations from the collaborative process and the allocation
of rights. The theoretical discussion in Part I will include a doctrinal
analysis of joint authorship. Part II will discuss the different requirements in the U.S. and English legal systems.
After the theoretical discussion, Part III will present the results
of quantitative research, consisting of a questionnaire distributed to
219 law students portraying a joint play written by two authors (one
is a dominant author, whereas the other is a secondary author whose
input to the work is relatively minor). Participants decided the rate
of reward granted to the secondary author in correspondence with
various contribution types (e.g., minor contribution, idea contribution, and a contribution pertaining to historical background of the
work’s plot). The empirical study has two goals. The first examines
the relationship between the legal principle (the number of reward
alternatives) and the mode in which the joint authors’ copyrights are
divided. The second examines whether the participants decided to
recognize joint authorship for contributions otherwise unprotected
by copyright law and to evaluate what corresponding rewards ought
to be granted for such contributions.
These research results clearly demonstrate that the legal principle at the core of the judicial method relates to the way in which
copyrights are divided between joint authors. The research findings
may imply that proportional allocation of rights, as sorted by the
English legal system, will grant economic rights to joint authors in
a greater number of cases compared to the United States’ “all-ornothing” model.
As for the second research goal, it was revealed that nearly half
of the participants chose to reward the secondary author in cases
where the contribution was not protected by copyright. For example,
this occurred where a secondary author contributed an idea or
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historical background, a contrary result to recent court decisions.7 In
addition, the research findings imply that participants were granted
a relatively low-rate reward—an average of approximately eight
percent—for an original idea contribution, and an average reward of
approximately fifteen percent for historical background contribution
assimilated into the joint work.
Upon examining the theoretical and empirical inputs, and based
on the findings and conclusions derived therein, this Article seeks to
propose an innovative, practical model that will address the ambiguous question: who is a joint author?
One goal of the model is to grant the “secondary joint author”
rights and royalties in a fair and just manner—commensurate to the
scope of his or her individual contribution to the final work—while
maintaining the public’s right to know a work’s source and the authors who contributed to it. The proposed model establishes a default principle—a presumption of sharing—from which a joint
work’s ownership would be divided into equal parts, unless the involved parties have agreed otherwise. This presumption of sharing
incentivizes parties to establish their ownership relationship through
a contractual agreement. Additionally, through redivision of the author’s image and scope of contribution, this model seeks to characterize the joint author’s identity into three groups.
The first group is the primary joint author (the so-called “typical
author”), who appears at the top of the hierarchy and is entitled to
ownership and control over the joint work. The primary joint author
significantly and essentially contributes to the joint work, makes
contributions that are original and copyrightable, and works in full
collaboration with the other authors.
The second group is made up of secondary joint authors, whose
contributions to a joint work are significant and copyrightable, despite being relatively smaller than that of other authors. Under the
proposed model, the secondary author is entitled to rights proportional to the scope of the contribution.

7

See, e.g., Ray v. Classic FM Plc [1998] FSR 622 (Ch) (Eng.); Stuart v. Barrett [1994]
EMLR 448 (Ch).
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The third group is the de minimis contributors, whose contributions are neither copyrightable nor made with the intent to create a
joint work. This would include, for instance, contributing technological and scientific knowledge, providing criticism, or arranging
and editing materials assimilated into a work. The “de minimis contributor” appears at the bottom of the hierarchy, and the contribution
will not entitle him or her to any ownership within the joint work.
However, the “de minimis contributor” should receive acknowledgment with a mention by name (credit or moral right).
Currently, no academic study has empirically demonstrated the
effect of the legal principle and the remuneration rate allocated to
secondary authors. This model’s chief purpose is to fill this gap and
encourage appropriate allocation of rights in a more distinct, efficient, and fair manner. Primarily, this model seeks to provide a categorical division of authors according to the type and scope of contributions. Finally, this model aims to promote judicial certainty in
the context of joint authorship, using fair compensation to incentivize authors to create.
I. THE THREE DOCTRINAL REQUIREMENTS TO ESTABLISH JOINT
AUTHORSHIP
Current copyright law regimes address the joint authorship doctrine in an extremely limited way.8 As a result, the court system is

8

The English copyright law defines “joint authorship” in Section 10(1) of the
Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 10 (UK) (“[A] work produced by the
collaboration of two or more authors in which the contribution of each author is not distinct
from that of the other authors.”). Comparison with other legal systems shows that the
contribution test is the main test in relation to the joint authorship doctrine. For example,
Canadian copyright law defines joint work as “[a] work produced by the collaboration of
two or more authors in which the contribution of one author is not distinct from that of the
other author or authors.” Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. C-42 (Can.). The German
copyright law defines joint work as, “[i]f several authors have combined their works for
exploitation in common, each of them may require from the others their consent to the
publication, exploitation or alteration of the compound works, if such consent may be
reasonably demanded of them.” Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte
[Urheberrechtsgesetz][UrhG] [Act on Copyright and Related Rights], Sept. 9, 1965,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I] at 1273, art. 9 (Ger.). Chinese copyright law defines
joint work, “[w]here a work is created jointly by two or more authors, the copyright in the
work shall be enjoyed jointly by the co-authors. No co-authorship may be claimed by
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left to settle joint authorship disputes, especially when parties did
not address their relationship contractually. Examination of the English and American copyright regimes suggests three major preconditions to establishing joint authorship: (1) each author’s level of
contribution; (2) the parties’ intention to create a joint work of authorship; and (3) the degree of control each author exercises in creating the work. This Article argues that the requirements for establishing joint authorship are vague, inconsistent, and poorly defined
by existing copyright regimes.
A. The Copyrightable Contribution Test
Most legal systems consider the “contribution test” the primary
test for determining the existence of joint authorship.9 However, the
degree of contribution required to prove joint authorship varies
across legal systems. In the English legal system, the contribution
test requires a significant and original contribution from each joint
author that is indistinguishable from the contributions of the other
joint authors.10 Each author’s contribution must add significant and
original creative input to the protectable, expressive parts of the joint
work.11 Significance and originality are questions of fact and degree,
yet each author’s contribution needs not be equal to the contribution
of the other authors’ contributions.12 This requirement presents the
challenge of precisely defining what constitutes a sufficient contribution.13

anyone who has not participated in the creation of the work.” Zhonghua RenMing GongHe
Guo ZhuZuoQuan Fa (中华人民共和国著作权法) [Copyright Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (promulgated by Decree of the President of People’s Republic of China,
Sept. 7, 1990, effective June 1, 1991), art. 13 (China).
9
See id. and accompanying text.
10
See Zemer, supra note 3, at 285 (“The contribution of each must not be distinct from
that of the other and each must significantly add original creative input to the protectable
expressive form of the creation.”).
11
See KEVIN GARNETT ET AL., COPINGER AND SKONE JAMES ON COPYRIGHT 333 (Sweet
& Maxwell eds., Thompson Reuters 16th ed. 2011).
12
LIOR ZEMER, THE IDEA OF AUTHORSHIP IN COPYRIGHT 191 (2007) (“The contribution
should not be separable or distinct from the contribution of any other collaborator and it
has to be substantial, but not necessarily equal.”).
13
See, e.g., Stuart v. Barrett [1994] EMLR 448 (Ch); Fylde Microsystems Ltd v. Key
Radio Systems Ltd [1998] FSR 449 (Ch); Brighton v. Jones [2004] EWHC (Ch) 1157.
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The following three cases demonstrate that English courts measure what constitutes a “significant contribution” by considering subjective and objective factors to determine whether a contributor’s
work falls within the category of “joint work.” A major English case,
Beckingham v. Hodgens, discussed the essence of joint authorship.14
In this case, a musician wrote a violin solo used in the famous song,
“Young at Heart.”15 The violinist requested recognition as a joint
author and to receive an equal share of royalties.16 Relying on the
aid of music specialists’ opinions, the court concluded that the contribution of the violin solo was sufficiently “significant and original,” granting the plaintiff half of the rights in the song.17
In another case, Fisher v. Brooker, the court recognized an organ
soloist as a joint author for his contribution to the famous 1967 song
“A Whiter Shade of Pale.”18 However, the court decided that he
would only be entitled to a proportional forty percent of authorship
rights.19 In a third case, Hadley v. Kamp, the Spandau Ballet band
members wanted to be recognized as joint authors with the primary
songwriter, Gary Kemp.20 The court based its decision on a quantitative assessment of the contribution each member added to the
songs.21 In the court’s opinion, the band members’ contributions
were insignificant and amounted to a mere “polishing” of the song’s
final version.22 They examined the musicians’ contributions and
14

Beckingham v. Hodgens [2003] EWCA (Civ) 143, [49]–[51] (Eng.); Bamgboye v.
Reed [2002] EWHC (QB) 2922 [40]–[41] (Eng.).
15
Beckingham, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 143, [49]–[51].
16
Id.
17
Id. at [12] (“Having heard the piece played, and reflected on the evidence given, I
conclude that the violin part does make a significant and original contribution of the right
kind of skill and labour to the Bluebells’ version of the song.”) (internal quotations
omitted).
18
Fisher v. Brooker, [2006] EWHC (Ch) 3239 (Eng.).
19
See id. at [98]; see also Luke McDonagh, Rearranging the Roles of the Performer and
the Composer in the Music Industry—the Potential Significance of Fisher v. Brooker, 1
INTELL. PROP. Q. 64 (2012).
20
Hadley v. Kemp [1999] EMLR 589 (Ch) (Eng.).
21
Id. at 592 (“Even in the case of ‘True,’ which contained the third plaintiff’s most
memorable improvisation, the saxophone solo was only 16 bars in length and occupied
under 9 per cent of the duration of the recording. Accordingly the third plaintiff was not a
joint author even of ‘True.’”).
22
Id. at 646–47 (“The members of the band…did what any good musician does: they
performed the songs to the best of their considerable abilities, injecting elements of
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determined that the saxophone player’s sixteen-bar solo, making up
only nine percent of the entire piece, was not sufficient for the player
to be considered a joint author.23
Due to the vagueness of “meaningful and original contributions,” many contrasting rulings can be found in English courts.24
For example, Cala v. Alfred addressed the issue of joint ownership
in architectural house sketches.25 The court decided that ideas can
be regarded as essential and significant contributions to a
collaborative work because the perception of who “pushed the pen”
is too narrow of a view of authorship.26 However, several years later
in Ray v. Classic FM, the court held that ideas alone could not be
regarded as sufficient contributions to a joint work.27 In 2019, at the
appeal of Martin v. Kogan, the court preferred the Cala approach,
noting that “[t]oo much focus on who pushed the pen is likely to
detract attention from what it is that is protected, and thus from who
the authors are….The statutory test does not go any further than asking who contributed to the creation of the work.”28
Indeed, although the distinction between a joint author and a
non-joint author (secondary contributor) is not clear-cut, the English

individuality and artistry into their performances. That did not make them joint authors of
the songs. In my judgment that remains so even if there were some elements of
improvisation in their performances.”).
23
See id. at 592.
24
See Cala Homes (S.) Ltd. v. Alfred McAlpine Homes E. Ltd. [1995] FSR 818 (Ch)
(Eng.). But see Ray v. Classic FM Plc [1998] FSR 622 (Ch) (Eng.). For an excellent
discussion concerning the difference between the cases, see ZEMER, supra note 12, at 192
(“The answer to the question of what exactly constitutes sufficient contribution is complex
and is fraught with conflicting interpretations.”).
25
Cala Homes (S.) Ltd. v. Alfred McAlpine Homes E. Ltd. [1995] FSR 818 (Ch) (Eng.).
26
“[T]o have regard merely to who pushed the pen is too narrow a view of authorship.
What is protected by copyright in a drawing or a literary work is more than just the skill of
making marks on paper or some other medium. It is both the words or lines and the skill
and effort involved in creating, selecting or gathering together the detailed concepts, data
or emotions which those words or lines have fixed in some tangible form which is
protected. It is wrong to think that only the person who carries out the mechanical act of
fixation is an author. There may well be skill and expertise in drawing clearly and well but
that does not mean that it is only that skill and expertise which is relevant.” Homes, [1995]
FSR at 835.
27
See Classic FM Plc, [1998] FSR at 636–37.
28
Martin v. Kogan [2019] EWCA (Civ) 1645, [35] (Eng.) (“In deciding whether there
was a collaboration, it can never be enough simply to ask who did the writing.”).
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courts have tried to characterize the meaning of “significant and
original contribution.”29 In one of the first cases dealing with this
matter, Levy v. Rutley, Justice Smith attempted to distinguish between a meaningful contribution and a secondary contribution to a
joint work.30 According to Justice Smith, “[i]t is, no doubt, difficult
to draw the line: but it never could be suggested that, when an author
submits his manuscript to a friend, and the friend makes alterations
and improvements, the latter would thereby become a joint author
of the work.”31
Even today, 150 years since the Rutley ruling, it seems that English courts have yet to define what constitutes a sufficient contribution required for joint authorship.32 In November 2017, the English
court decided to reject a claim of joint authorship in Martin v.
Kogan.33 At issue was the rights in the screenplay of the movie Florence Foster Jenkins.34 Two years later, the Court of Appeal reversed
the decision.35 Judge Floyd analyzed Section 10(1) of the English
Copyright, Designs and Patent Act, which provides four elements
for joint authorship: (1) collaboration; (2) authorship; (3) contribution; and (4) non-distinctness of contribution.36 In doing so, the English courts exemplified an important attempt to conceptualize the
contribution requirement by including different kinds of contributions, such as ideas, to the definition of joint work.37
29

In the case of Ray v. Classic FM, the court stated that “[a] joint author must participate
in the writing and share responsibility for the form of expression in the literary work. He
must accordingly do more than contribute ideas to an author: he must be an author (or
creator) of the work in question.” [1998] FSR at 636; see, e.g., Tate v. Thomas, [1921] 1
Ch 503 at 506; Ashmore v. Douglas-Home [1987] FSR 553 (Ch) at 563 (Eng.); Wiseman
v. George Weidenfeld & Nicholson Ltd. [1985] FSR 525 (Ch) at 531 (Eng.) (“Mr.
Wiseman…was a useful critic, able to say pertinent things about how plays should be
written; but, says Mr. Donaldson, he certainly did not write the play.”).
30
See Levy v. Rutley [1871] 6 LRCP 523 (Eng.).
31
Id. at 530.
32
See generally id.; see also Zemer, supra note 3, at 285.
33
Martin v. Kogan [2017] EWHC (IPEC) 2927, [78], [85] (UK).
34
Id. at [1].
35
Martin v. Kogan [2019] EWCA (Civ) 1645, [35] (UK).
36
See id. at [35]–[50].
37
Id. at [11] (“Ms[.] Kogan alleged in her defense that…on 17 February 2014 Mr.
Martin asked her what proportion of the screenplay she thought she owned, and that Mr[.]
Martin had volunteered that it was 15%.”). For discussion on the contributions of ideas,
see id. at [35]–[37] (“A collaborative work may thus come into existence if, in the context
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The American legal system has two leading approaches to the
interpretation of the contribution test.38 The first guiding and stern
approach—the Goldstein approach—was adopted by U.S. courts,
providing that the standard for joint authorship requires contributing
creative expression to the work by each contributor.39 In Goldstein’s
words, “[c]ollaborative contribution will not produce a joint work,
and a contributor will not obtain a co-ownership interest, unless the
contribution represents original expression that could stand on its
own as the subject matter of copyright.”40 This means that the contribution needs to be fixed in a tangible medium of expression into
the copyrightable joint work and cannot only be an idea, refinement,
or suggestion that stands alone and is not subject to copyright protection.41
The second approach, the Nimmer approach, was widely rejected by U.S. courts.42 It requires only a minimal contribution to
the joint work. According to this approach, every contribution that
adds to the copyrighted work will be considered a sufficient contribution to the establishment of a joint work.43 According to Nimmer,
“[c]opyright’s goal of fostering creativity is best served…by rewarding all parties who labor together to unite idea with form, and

of a particular joint project, one person decides on the plot and the other writes the words
to give effect to the plot. There will be a panoply of other ways of working as well, for
example the labour of writing may be shared, or the labour of working out the plot, scenes
and characters may be shared…Here again it is wrong to focus exclusively on the person
who does the writing. There is a further important distinction to bear in mind, which is that
between the making of the work and its reduction to material form (or fixation). The work
may exist before its reduction to material form.”).
38
The American copyright law defines “joint work” in the US Copyright Act of 1976
as a “work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contribution be
merged into inseparable or interdependent unitary whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. It appears that
American law mirrors English law but with two main differences: (1) the requirement of
intention, and (2) the component of interdependency. 17 U.S.C. §101.
39
See PAUL GOLDSTEIN & P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT:
PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE 232–33 (4th ed. 2019).
40
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 4.2.1.2 (3d ed. 2005).
41
See Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1069–71 (7th Cir. 1994).
42
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 6.07[A][3][a]
(Matthew Bender ed., 2021).
43
Id.
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that copyright protection should extend both to the contributor of the
skeletal ideas and the contributor who fleshes out the project.”44
Despite the American courts’ support of the Goldstein approach,
some interesting cases have arisen in which the courts have adopted
a more lenient one. For instance, in Gaiman v. McFarlane, the plaintiff provided the attributes of three comic book characters, whereas
the defendant provided their visual dimensions.45 The court stated
that although each author’s contribution was not independently
copyrightable, the sum of their contributions led to recognition of
their work as a joint work.46 Justice Posner reasoned:
But where two or more people set out to create a
character jointly in such mixed media as comic books
and motion pictures and succeed in creating a copyrightable character, it would be paradoxical if though
the result of their joint labors had more than enough
originality and creativity to be copyrightable, no one
could claim copyright. That would be peeling the onion until it disappeared. The decisions that say,
rightly in the generality of cases, that each contributor to a joint work must make a contribution that if it
stood alone would be copyrightable weren’t thinking
of the case in which it couldn’t stand alone because
of the nature of the particular creative process that
had produced it.47
44

Id.
Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 650 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Teresa Huang,
Gaiman v. McFarlane: The Right Step in Determining Joint Authorship for Copyrighted
Material, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 673, 696–67 (2005).
46
See Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 659.
47
Id. at 658–59 (“The contents of a comic book are typically the joint work of four
artists— the writer, the penciler who creates the artwork (McFarlane), the inker (also
McFarlane, in the case of Spawn No. 9, but it would often be a different person from the
penciler) who makes a black and white plate of the artwork, and the colorist who colors it.
The finished product is copyrightable, yet one can imagine cases in which none of the
separate contributions of the four collaborating artists would be. The writer might have
contributed merely a stock character (not copyrightable, as we’re about to see) that
achieved the distinctiveness required for copyrightability only by the combined
contributions of the penciler, the inker, and the colorist, with each contributing too little to
have by his contribution alone carried the stock character over the line into copyright
land.”).
45
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In Brown v. Flowers, an American court supported the minimal
contribution approach.48 In Brown, a claim was brought by a music
producer who requested recognition as a joint author of songs he
recorded.49 The court examined the nature of the relationship between the parties and, despite its fundamental support of the “minimal contribution test,” decided that the producer’s specific contribution was too minimal to suffice, even under the more lenient
test.50 In general, the challenge of defining what constitutes a sufficient contribution remains a complex issue, fraught with conflicting
interpretations from legal systems.
B. The Mutual Intention Test
Only the American legal system requires the “mutual intention
test.”51 American courts’ decisions show that their interpretation of
the intention requirement is inconsistent and has become stricter
over the years.52 Previously, authors were required to prove intention to combine their contributions into a joint work.53 Since the
leading case of Childress v. Taylor,54 the requirement has become
more stringent. Now authors must not only prove an intent to combine their contributions, but also that each intended to create a joint
work throughout the creation process.55 Similar to the contribution

Brown v. Flowers, 297 F. Supp. 2d 846, 852 (M.D.N.C. 2003).
Id. at 851–52.
50
Id. at 852.
51
See Beckingham v. Hodgens [2003] EWCA (Civ) 143, [49]–[53]; Martin v. Kogan
[2019] EWCA (Civ) 1645, [53] (Eng.) (“There is no further requirement that the authors
must have subjectively intended to create a work of joint authorship.”).
52
See Balganesh, supra note 3, at 1699; see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 120 (1976)
(“The touchstone here is the intention, at the time the writing is done, that the parts be
absorbed or combined into an integrated unit….”).
53
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976) at 120 (“The touchstone here is the intention, at the
time the writing is done, that the parts be absorbed or combined into an integrated unit,
although the parts themselves may be either ‘inseparable’ (as the case of a novel or
painting) or ‘interdependent’ (as in the case of a motion picture, opera, or the words and
music of a song).”).
54
945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991).
55
Id. at 507 (“The wording of the statutory definition appears to make relevant only the
state of mind regarding the unitary nature of the finished work—an intention ‘that their
contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.’
However, an inquiry so limited would extend joint author status to many persons who are
not likely to have been within the contemplation of Congress.”).
48
49
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test, the main problem with the intention test is the inconsistency in
courts’ decisions and the wide range of interpretations of “intention.”56
American courts’ inconsistent interpretation of the intention test
leaves the test vague and undefined.57 Notably, Shyamkrishna Balganesh critiqued the perceived centrality of the intention test, noting
how American courts provide divergent interpretations and have yet
to define it properly:
It is therefore somewhat surprising that despite their
insistence that mutual intention remain the “touchstone” of unplanned coauthorship, and their continuing emphasis on discerning parties’ intentions whenever presented with claims of unplanned coauthorship, courts have found little common ground in unraveling the precise nature and analytical content of
this intention.58
As a result, several crucial problems can be found in the
intention test. First, the test is ambiguous and does not provide a
practical solution to define a joint collaborative work.59 Second, the
intention test may be abused by secondary authors to make frivolous
claims about the existence of a joint intention in order to gain

56

See id. at 505–09; Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1068–69 (7th Cir.
1994); Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 201–05 (2d Cir. 1998); Weissmann v. Freeman,
868 F.2d 1315, 1319 (2d Cir. 1989); Maxwood Music Ltd. v. Malakian, 713 F. Supp. 2d
327, 345–46 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 956 (11th
Cir. 2009); Corwin v. Quinonez, 858 F. Supp. 2d 903, 910 (N.D. Ohio 2012).
57
Thomas Margoni & Mark Perry, Ownership in Complex Authorship: A Comparative
Study of Joint Works in Copyright Law, 34 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 22, 28 (2012)
(speaking to the intention requirement, “case law shows a long list of different
interpretations and variations of this theme.”); Russ VerSteeg, Intent, Originality,
Creativity and Joint Authorship, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 123, 170 (2002) (“The failure to define
intent is a weakness in the Childress formulation.”).
58
Balganesh, supra note 3, at 1702. Another important critique can be found in the
words of ZEMER, supra note 12, at 202 (“A more critical consequence where no protection
is secured for nondominant contributors is their inability to protect their moral rights.
Honour and dignity, and other personal interests are likely to be affected.”).
59
See Gilad Vekesselman, The Joint Work in Copyrights 102–04 (Nov. 14, 2007) (Ph.D.
dissertation, Tel Aviv University) (on file with author).
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recognition as a joint author.60 Third, the test may be abused to make
a claim for lack of joint intention that will confer too much control
to the dominant authors of a work.61
C. The “Master Mind” Test
The third test is the “master mind”—or “control”—test adopted
primarily by the American court in Aalmuhammed v. Lee.62 Courts
have considered this test as the most important of the three.63 According to this test, a joint author must prove an element of control
over the work, making him the “master mind.”64 Under this test, the
author must control the work’s creation or, alternatively, be the
dominant author making decisions about the joint work.65
The control test leaves several issues unresolved. First, it limits
ownership of jointly authored works to the person or persons who
“masterminded” or “superintended” the creation of the work.66

60

Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[P]utative coauthors
make objective manifestations of a shared intent to be coauthors….We say objective
manifestations because, were the mutual intent to be determined by subjective intent, it
could become an instrument of fraud, were one coauthor to hide from the other an intention
to take sole credit for the work.”).
61
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Commodifying Collaborative Research, in THE
COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 397, 407–08 (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil W. Netanel
eds., 2002) (“Since that interpretation [of the intent requirement] permits any single
member of the collaborative team to veto the full participation of all other
members…participants who lack bargaining power can be in a worse position under the
joint authorship provision than under the work for hire doctrine.…That [the copyrightable
contribution requirement] eliminates the possibility that certain contributors—for example,
statisticians who contribute only factual material—will be protected by the statute.”). But
see David M. Liston, Note, Songwriter, Side Musician, or Sucker?: The Challenge of
Distinguishing Composers from Contributors Under U.S. Copyright Law and the Lessons
of a Famous British Case, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 891, 914–17 (2013).
62
Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1234.
63
Id. (“Control in many cases will be the most important factor.”).
64
Id. at 1233 (defining “author” as the “inventive or master mind” who “creates, or gives
effect to the idea”).
65
Id. at 1234 (“This will likely be a person ‘who has actually formed the picture by
putting the persons in position, and arranging the place where the people are to be-the man
who is the effective cause of that,’ or ‘the inventive or master mind’ who ‘creates, or gives
effect to the idea.’”) (internal citations omitted).
66
See Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Shyamkrishna Balganesh et al. in Support of
Neither Party at 13, Garcia v. Google Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (No. 12-57302)
(“The master-mind concept narrows the range of joint authors down to one or a few
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Second, it increases uncertainty among authors who cannot know in
advance whether their contributions are sufficient to confer copyright ownership in the joint work.67 Third, adopting this test may
lead to a reduction in the number of recognized joint authors, as
many might not meet the test’s requirements. Fourth, the control test
can lead to absurd outcomes where a joint work has no owner because there is no author who can meet the “control” requirements.68
Accordingly, all three joint authorship tests are vague and lead
to inconsistent interpretations and results. This reality creates absurd
cases whereby two or more authors work together and contribute to
the final work, but copyright law does not acknowledge the joint
authorship. Unfortunately, this situation occurs quite frequently and,
as a result, courts may deny economic rewards to one or more of the
authors. As Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky describe, “[t]he
adverse effects of unsatisfactory resolutions of collaborators’ rights
go well beyond questions of distributive justice among the litigants.
How copyright law treats collaborators’ rights affects two other crucial interests: the incentive to create and the efficiency of use.”69
To incentivize creation, courts should ensure that the incentive
for authors to work together is not negatively affected by the lack of
reward for their contributions (e.g., their financial and moral rights).
If future authors believe their contributions to a joint work will not
yield proportional financial profit, they will lack motivation to collaborate.70 Alternatively, recognition of various types of
individuals for administrative convenience or to avoid unjustified windfalls, not out of
fidelity to legislative intent.”).
67
See id. at 14 (“[U]nder the control standard, it is impossible for contributing authors
to know in advance whether they are exercising sufficient control over the unitary work
while making their individual contributions.”).
68
Id. at 15 (“Finally and perhaps most importantly, thoughtful application of the control
test raises the absurd possibility that, in some situations, none of the contributors to the
work will qualify as an author. This possibility is especially likely with motion pictures,
where the person exercising control over the final work (e.g., the producer) often makes
little copyrightable contribution to it, whereas the individual contributors of expression
exercise no ultimate control over the movie as a whole.”).
69
Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 2, at 1018.
70
See ZEMER, supra note 12, at 188 (“[T]he vague formulation of the conditions for joint
authorship creates absurd situations in which, although two or more individuals contribute
to the creation of a product meriting joint entitlement, copyright ‘refuses to acknowledge
the existence of ‘joint authorship,’ or does so grudgingly. The consequences from this
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contributions—like ideas or secondary contributions—could reduce
future incentives for primary joint authors to produce due to the concern that profits would inevitably be shared with secondary authors
whose contribution is comparatively insignificant.
As to promoting joint works’ use efficiency, courts should avoid
negatively affecting exploitation of existing joint authorship works
resulting from lacking principles and regulations necessary to control and use these works.71 In the English and American legal systems, the conditions for exploiting joint works are based on different
use principles. The American legal system follows the freedom of
use principle.72 Each joint author has the right to use, reproduce,
create derivative works, distribute copies, and license the work as
he or she wishes, subject only to the obligation of accounting earned
profits to the other joint owners.73 A joint author can transfer his or
her undivided ownership shares without approval from the other
joint authors.74 However, all of the authors must consent to granting
an exclusive license to use the joint work and filing a claim against
a third party for infringement of the joint work.75 In contrast, under
the English legal system, joint authors cannot use, reproduce, create
derivative works, distribute copies, or grant non-exclusive use licenses to third parties without the consent of all owners.76

practice are manifold and include: denial of ‘economic rewards to persons whose creative
efforts satisfy the constitutional and statutory concepts of authorship’; [and] destabilization
of the economic incentive-based rationale to the ownership of intellectual products….”).
71
See id. at 188; Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 2, at 1026 (“As scholars have noted,
many aspects of joint authorship remain controversial and unclear.”); Mary LaFrance,
Authorship, Dominance, and the Captive Collaborator: Preserving the Rights of Joint
Authors, 50 EMORY L.J. 193, 194, 255 (2001).
72
17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (“The authors of a joint work are coowners of copyright in the
work.”).
73
Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 1998); see Batiste v. Island Records,
Inc., 179 F.3d 217, 223 (5th Cir. 1999); Diplomatic Man, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., No. 08 Civ.
139, 2009 WL 935674, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2009).
74
17 U.S.C. §§ 201, 203; see Jaffe, supra note 4, at 1555.
75
17 U.S.C. § 201; Jaffe, supra note 4, at 1555.
76
See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 173(2) (UK) (“Where copyright
(or any aspect of copyright) is owned by more than one person jointly, references in this
Part to the copyright owner are to all the owners, so that, in particular, any requirement of
the license of the copyright owner requires the license of all of them.”); see also Powell v.
Head [1879] 12 Ch. D. 686 (Eng.); Godfrey v. Lees [1995] EMLR 307 (Ch) at 333 (UK).
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II. THE CURRENT JOINT AUTHORSHIP MODELS
The joint authorship doctrine has become more significant over
the last several years. In many cases, collaborations are not temporary or singular events that cease after the achievement of a single
product, but rather become fertile ground for successful, ongoing,
future collaborations (e.g., the Open Source platform).77 Two essential advantages promote and encourage joint works. The first is specialization. A joint work created by many authors may yield unique
creations that could not have been achieved by a sole author.78 Thus,
in this current global age, many collaborations are formed among
people from a variety of fields in different parts of the world, with
each person contributing his or her own expertise to the joint work.
For example, if several authors write an article together, it may be
possible that one of them is talented in devising ideas, the second
may be a talented writer, and the third may contribute an empirical
model for examining an idea.
Second, a collaborative work among many authors most likely
leads to mutual inspiration and brainstorming (“spillover”),
whereby every author shares and inspires the others with knowledge
and talent, thereby enhancing the joint project.79 For instance, behavioral economics refers to the collaboration among authors from
different fields of knowledge, working together and inspiring each

77

DANIELA SIMONE, COPYRIGHT AND COLLECTIVE AUTHORSHIP: LOCATING THE
AUTHORS OF COLLABORATIVE WORK 1–2 (2019). For further information about Open
Source
platform,
see
What
Is
Open
Source?,
OPEN
SOURCE,
https://opensource.com/resources/what-open-source [https://perma.cc/2RC4-9JY4].
78
See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 2, at 1016.
79
For nearly fifty years, credit for the song “Imagine” was granted solely to one writer,
John Lennon. See Elias Leight, Yoko Ono Will Receive Songwriting Credit on John
Lennon’s ‘Imagine,’
ROLLING
STONE
(June
15,
2017,
3:17
PM),
https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/yoko-ono-will-receive-songwritingcredit-on-john-lennons-imagine-195957/ [https://perma.cc/ZQG9-DVUA]. This changed
in June 2017 when the National Music Publishers Association announced that Yoko Ono
would be credited as a joint songwriter. Id. Lennon provided the rationale for this in 1980
during a joint interview with Yoko Ono on BBC Radio 1. Id. In the interview Lennon said
“[t]hat [‘Imagine’] should be credited as a Lennon-Ono song because a lot of it—the lyric
and the concept—came from Yoko. But those days I was a bit more selfish, a bit more
macho, and I sort of omitted to mention her contribution.” Id.
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other.80 According to Gregory Mandel, collaboration promotes creativity, and intellectual property law should therefore promote collaboration.81
These essential advantages make the joint authorship doctrine
one that influences creative individuals and enriches the intellectual
resources of society as a whole. Further, it is worth noting the
doctrine’s unique characteristics. Each author owns the work as a
whole and not just the part he or she contributed—a characteristic
of American law known as “tenancy in common.”82 Namely,
whether there are two, three, or ten authors, each is perceived as the
author of the joint work as a whole and not just the owner of the
specific part he or she contributed.
In addition, the authors’ contributions do not need to be equal in
terms of quantity, quality, or originality—it must only be significant.83 However, in cases where there is no agreement regarding the
allocation of rights between joint authors, it seems that the American
legal system will only recognize joint authorship if the authors’ contributions are similar in scope.84 In cases where there is a dominant
80

According to Mandel, “[t]he entire field of nanotechnology, for example, involves
advanced aspects of physics, chemistry, and biology such that multidisciplinary
collaboration is essential for most work. Collaboration is also increasing in the arts, for
instance, to produce more complex works or works that will appeal to individuals across a
wide range of cultures.” Gregory N. Mandel, Left-Brain versus Right-Brain: Competing
Conceptions of Creativity in Intellectual Property Law, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283, 350
(2010).
81
See id. at 352.
82
See Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Shyamkrishna Balganesh et al. in Support of
Neither Party at 18, Garcia v. Google Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (No. 12-57302).
83
Hadley v. Kemp [1999] EMLR 589 (Ch) at 642–43.
84
See Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Shyamkrishna Balganesh et al. in Support of
Neither Party at 20 (“While joint authorship thus creates a tenancy in common it does not
mandate equal ownership shares, especially when parties have made unequal contributions
to the work. A court may therefore presume equal ownership shares in a joint work only
when each author has made an equal contribution.”); see also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall,
“Author-Stories:” Narrative’s Implications for Moral Right and Copyright’s Joint
Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 52 (2001) (“The underlying concern voiced by
both the Childress and Thomson courts is that a sole author will be denied exclusive
authorship status simply because another contributor provides some form of assistance.
Therefore, these courts interpreted the joint authorship doctrine to de-emphasize
collaboration at the expense of independent copyrightability and mutual intent. These
requirements, when applied together, effectively ignore the nondominant author’s
personality-based narrative of creation.”).
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author and a secondary author, American courts are more likely to
deny the secondary author’s claim and grant full authorship to the
dominant author.85 In contrast, since the beginning of the twentyfirst century, there has been a shift in English courts’ approach, assigning ownership proportionally based on each individual’s contribution.86 In other words, the respective shares of joint authors are
not required to be equal, but can reflect, pro rata, the relative
amounts of their contributions.87
Another unique characteristic of the joint authorship doctrine is
the duration of protection for the joint work. Under copyright law,
protection granted to a joint work lasts up to seventy years after the
death of the last surviving joint author.88 This means that the validity
of jointly authored works could have a longer duration as compared
with that of a solo creation.89 To delay the expiration of copyright—
at which point the work falls into the public domain—authors may
attempt to extend copyright protection of their works by manipulatively adding a “young” joint author.90 While this feature encapsulates a counterargument to recognition of joint authorship, this concern is not a valid reason to deny copyright protection to a joint
work. When raised before the court, the court should examine the
significance of each joint author’s contribution and determine
whether the work qualifies as a joint work.91

85

See, e.g., Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 509 (2d Cir. 1991); Thomson v. Larson,
147 F.3d 195, 202, 205 (2d Cir. 1998).
86
See, e.g., Fisher v. Brooker [2006] EWHC (Ch) 3239, [55] (Eng.).
87
Martin v. Kogan [2019] EWCA (Civ) 1645, [53] (Eng.).
88
17 U.S.C. § 302(b) (“In the case of a joint work prepared by two or more authors who
did not work for hire, the copyright endures for a term consisting of the life of the last
surviving author and 70 years after such last surviving author’s death.”).
89
Id.
90
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 40.
91
See Timothy J. McFarlin, An Idea of Authorship: Orson Welles, The War of the
Worlds Copyright, and Why We Should Recognize Idea-Contributors as Joint Authors, 66
CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 701, 766 (2016) (“I agree with Professor Goldstein that it’s an
important goal to reserve joint authorship for those who we believe really deserve it, and
that the impact joint authorship rules have on the length of copyright is another good reason
we should care about them. I disagree, however, with the premise that we need the artificial
construct of independent copyrightability in joint authorship to accomplish this goal.”).
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A. The All-or-Nothing Model
Recognizing creators as joint authors is an arduous task for
courts where such authors did not initially settle their rights by contract. Despite that joint works do not necessarily require an equal
contribution from each author, it is apparent that courts seek equal
contribution from every author, especially in American courts.92 In
cases where the contribution is not equal, courts tend to disregard
the secondary author’s contributions in favor of the dominant author’s interest.93 This likely results from the common perception that
a joint work, by definition, must lead to an equal distribution of
rights among joint authors and to equal use and management of a
joint work.94
The leading model in the American legal system is the “all-ornothing model,” whereby only a contribution equal in quality and
quantity will grant an author recognition as a joint author.95 Accordingly, equal rights will stem from the joint work.96 The primary criticism of this model is that it prevents additional types of contributions from being recognized as helpful to the joint work.97 Childress
v. Taylor illustrates both the lack of flexibility and the vague requirements that characterize the American legal system.98 In this case, the
Second Circuit stated:
Care must be taken to ensure that true collaborators
in the creative process are accorded the perquisites of
co-authorship and to guard against the risk that a sole
author is denied exclusive authorship status because
another person rendered some form of assistance.
Copyright law best serves the interests of creativity
92

See e.g., Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 508–09 (2d Cir. 1991); Thomson v.
Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1998).
93
See, e.g., Childress, 945 F.2d at 508–09; Thomson 147 F.3d at 202, 205.
94
See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 2, at 1064 (“The courts, rather than Congress,
decided to adopt the model of tenancy in common for all joint authorships. No statute
requires using the model in all cases.”).
95
See, e.g., Childress, 945 F.2d at 508–09; Jaffe, supra note 4, at 1550.
96
Jaffe, supra note 4, at 1555 (“[U]nless there is an agreement to the contrary, courts
invoke a conclusive presumption that all co-authors share in the profits equally, regardless
of whether their contributions to the work were equal.”).
97
ZEMER, supra note 12, at 201–02.
98
Childress, 945 F.2d at 508–09.
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when it carefully draws the bounds of “joint authorship” so as to protect the legitimate claims of both
sole authors and co-authors.99
As a direct result of the all-or-nothing model, the American system supports a dichotomist remuneration model.100 Under this
model, the court has two alternatives. The first recognizes the authors as joint authors and, as a result, dividing rights equally among
them.101 Alternatively, if the court decides the authors’ contributions
are not equal in quantity or quality, it will deny the claim for joint
authorship and grant ownership of the work to the dominant author.102 In Thomson v. Larson, the plaintiff claimed a sixteen percent
share of the profits from the Broadway musical Rent for her contributions to the play’s script.103 The Second Circuit rejected the claim
that the musical was a joint work since Thomson did not contribute
the same “amount” as Larson and the parties lacked a joint intention.104
Criticism against this perception was raised by various schol105
ars. Some note that courts added the mastermind test due to a
wrongful interpretation that joint authors must receive equal rights
in a joint work.106 However, neither legislative history nor common
99

Id. at 504.
Jaffe, supra note 4, at 1550.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 1557–58 (“If the court grants him joint authorship status, the equality principle
entitles him to fifty percent ownership in the work. If the court does not consider him a
joint author he is left without any ownership interest and is limited to unjust enrichment
remedies.…[T]he equality principle incentivizes and creates an inordinate amount of
litigation because the large difference between a fifty percent ownership interest versus
zero ownership interest makes many cases worth litigating.”).
103
Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[Thomson] asked that the
court declare her a ‘co-author’ of Rent and grant her 16% of the author’s share of the
royalties.”).
104
Id. at 206–07.
105
See Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Shyamkrishna Balganesh et al. in Support of
Neither Party at 18, Garcia v. Google Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (No. 12-57302)
106
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 121 (1976) (“[C]o-owners of copyright would be treated
generally as tenants in common….”); see also Brief of Amici Curiae Professors
Shyamkrishna Balganesh et al. in Support of Neither Party at 38 (“Part of the reason that
the Aalmuhammed panel may have opted for its narrow conception of joint authorship was
a mistaken concern that all joint owners are necessarily entitled to coequal sharing of the
fruits of the collaborative enterprise.”).
100
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law principles indicate that Congress’ understanding of a joint work
requires this.107 Some scholars have emphasized:
While joint authorship thus creates a tenancy in common, it does not mandate equal ownership shares, especially when parties have made unequal contributions to the work. A court may therefore presume
equal ownership shares in a joint work only when
each author has made an equal contribution. In cases
where the authors have each made disparate copyrightable contributions to the work, the authors’
ownership shares should be determined in relative
proportion to their individual contributions, as dictated by the common law.108
B. The Proportional Model
In contrast to the American model, in the early twenty-first century, the English legal system shifted from an “all-or-nothing”
model to a proportional contribution model.109 This required courts
to acknowledge an author’s ownership share relative to his contribution to the work as a whole.110
One of the first cases in the English legal system to establish the
proportional allocation of rights was Hadley v. Kemp.111 The court’s
opinion provided that equal assignment of rights among joint
authors should not be the default and may vary according to a case’s
107

Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Shyamkrishna Balganesh et al. in Support of Neither
Party at 18.
108
See id. at 20–21 (“And if Mr. Aalmuhammed were deemed a joint author, then his
contribution of a few lines of dialog used without permission might reasonably have
entitled him to a similar tiny fraction of the proceeds of Malcolm X, rather than the massive
share that his overreaching complaint demanded or the 0% that this court actually awarded
him.”).
109
Martin v. Kogan [2019] EWCA (Civ) 1645, [53] (Eng.) (“[T]he respective shares of
joint authors are not required to be equal, but can reflect, pro rata, the relative amounts of
their contributions.”); Bamgboye v. Reed [2002] EWHC (QB) 2922, [42] (Eng.); Fisher v.
Brooker [2006] EWHC (Ch) 3239.
110
Martin v. Kogan [2019] EWCA (Civ) 1645, [53] (Eng.) (“[T]he respective shares of
joint authors are not required to be equal, but can reflect, pro rata, the relative amounts of
their contributions.”); Bamgboye v. Reed [2002] EWHC (QB) 2922, [42] (Eng.); Fisher v.
Brooker [2006] EWHC (Ch) 3239.
111
Hadley v. Kemp [1999] EMLR 589 (Ch) (UK).
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specific circumstances.112 Several years later, in Bamgboye v. Reed,
the Court of Appeal in England restated this recognition based on
the author’s relative contribution.113 According to the Court, “[t]here
is no requirement that joint authorship necessarily involves equality
on a 50:50 basis. It would be possible for there to be, as it were, a
joint ownership in unequal shares in principle.”114 The Court found
that the plaintiff’s contribution did not amount to fifty percent of the
joint work’s rights because he was not “the mastermind behind the
joint work,” and Mr. Reed made the arrangements himself.
However, it stated that lack of control would not automatically bar
the plaintiff’s claim.115 Rather, the court granted the plaintiff reduced rights to the creation, specifically thirty-three percent of the
joint work’s rights.116 The court stated the following:
I therefore find that [plaintiff] did contribute the melody, and I also find that he contributed significantly
to the drum pattern and crashes, as he said . . . He,
therefore, did have significant creative input into the
making of the musical piece that was recorded as
“Bouncing Flow.” However, I do not find that this
creative input is as great as the 50%, which he
claims. He has more musical and original creative
talent in this regard than he has been given credit
for . . . [Plaintiff] also acknowledged that ideas only
stayed in if [defendant] liked them and not if he did
not . . . [the defendant’s] contribution was, therefore,
greater. In the end, I have come to the conclusion on
the evidence that their respective contributions are

112

Id. at 643 (“[A]ll the cases…agree that, if two or more persons are joint authors, they
own the copyright in equal shares.…It would be surprising if a slight contribution was
enough to make a person a joint author and thereby make him an equal owner with another
or others who had contributed far more than he had.”).
113
See Bamgboye v. Reed [2002] EWHC (QB) 2922, [42] (Eng.).
114
Id.
115
Id. at [77] (“In the end, I have come to the conclusion on the evidence that their
respective contributions are fairly represented as one third on the part of Mr. Bamgboye
and two-thirds on the part of Mr. Reed.”).
116
Id.
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fairly represented as one-third on the part of [plaintiff] and two-thirds on the part of [defendant].117
In 2006, the English court returned to the proportionate contribution model in Fisher v. Brooker.118 There, the court granted a solo
musician forty percent of ownership interest in a song written in
1967.119 In doing so, the court acknowledged the musician’s proportional contribution in a claim filed nearly forty years after the song
was composed.120 Again, the Court of Appeal and House of Lords
approved.121 Further, the court emphasized that the English legal
system is not obligated to apply the one-size-fits-all model.122 Rather, the court is entitled to divide joint authors’ rights proportionally, based on individual contributions.123 The proportional contribution model was affirmed again in the last decade.124
In Minder v. Sharples, a music producer claimed joint authorship of the song “Touch Sensitive,” alleging that his original contribution, although minor to the work, should have conferred him a
twenty-percent ownership interest in the joint work’s rights.125 Similarly, in Martin v. Kogan, the Court of Appeal retried the decision

117

See id. at [76]–[77] (emphasis added).
Fisher v. Brooker [2006] EWHC (Ch) 3239.
119
Id. at [98] (“The question ultimately is a highly subjective one. Doing the best I can I
have come to the view that Mr[.] Fisher’s interest in the Work should be reflected by
according him a 40 per cent share in the musical copyright.”).
120
Id. at [51] (“[T]he arrangement was exploited for nearly 40 years without objection
from Mr[.] Fisher.”).
121
See Fisher v. Brooker [2008] EWCA (Civ) 287, [140]; Fisher v. Brooker [2009]
UKHL 41, [80] (“In these circumstances, essentially for the reasons given at first instance
by Blackburne J. and in the Court of Appeal by David Richards J., I would reject all the
respondents’ arguments based on equitable principles.”).
122
Fisher v. Brooker [2006] EWHC (Ch) 3239, [96] (“I see no reason in principle why
Mr. Fisher’s share in the work should not be something less than an equal undivided share
if the circumstances justify that result.”).
123
Id.
124
Minder Music Ltd. v. Sharples, [2015] EWHC (IPEC) 1454, [71], [82]; Martin v.
Kogan [2017] EWHC (IPEC) 2927, [85]; Martin v. Kogan [2019] EWCA (Civ) 1645, [43].
125
See Minder Music Ltd. v. Sharples, [2015] EWHC (IPEC) 1454, at [90] (“[Since] his
contribution to the Album Version was relatively small, I do not accept that his share of
the copyright would have been as great as one-third. In my view, his contribution as coauthor would have been properly reflected by a 20 per cent share of the copyright in the
music of the Album Version.”).
118
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by the Intellectual Property Enterprise Court.126 It rejected the claim
of joint authorship over a script due to one partner’s minimal and
insignificant contribution.127 There, the Court recognized that being
joint authors does not automatically confer equal rights among
them.128 According to the Court, “[i]t is common ground that the
shares of two joint authors are not required to be equal. If Ms. Kogan
and Mr. Martin are joint authors, the court will have to go on and
apportion the ownership according to their respective overall contributions.”129
III. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
A. Methodology
The following quantitative research examines whether the distribution of rights across various legal systems affects the allocation
of compensation between joint authors. Put more precisely, how
does the allocation of rights affect the percentage of remunerations
awarded to a secondary author? This research also considers
whether a secondary author should receive a reward for uncopyrightable contributions, such as the addition of an idea or historical
background, contrary to present-day courts’ decisions.130
To answer these questions, this Article details a quantitative survey based on a questionnaire divided into three versions and
distributed to 219 law students. Each questionnaire contains two
parts. The first part describes a situation in which two authors meet
to write a play and their contributions are asymmetric, resulting in a
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Martin v. Kogan [2017] EWHC (IPEC) 2927; Martin v. Kogan [2019] EWCA (Civ)
1645.
127
Martin v. Kogan [2017] EWHC (IPEC) 2927, at [85] (“In my judgment the textual
and non-textual contributions made by Ms[.] Kogan never rose above the level of providing
useful jargon, along with helpful criticism and some minor plot suggestions. Taken
together they were not sufficient to qualify Ms[.] Kogan as a joint author of the Screenplay,
even had those contributions all been made in the course of a collaboration to create the
Screenplay. Mr[.] Martin was the sole author.”).
128
Martin v. Kogan [2019] EWCA (Civ) 1645, at [52].
129
Id.
130
See, e.g., Ray v. Classic FM Plc [1998] FSR 622 (Ch) (Eng.); Erickson v. Trinity
Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1071 (7th Cir. 1994).
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dominant and secondary author. The scenario provides as follows:131
Joseph is a famous and well-known author
who has written dozens of plays and books that have
become bestsellers. Over the past year, Joseph began
writing a musical with the hope it would eventually
be produced and performed on Broadway stages. After writing a large part of the script of the musical,
Joseph turned to Adam, a well-known theater producer, and asked for his help in producing the musical in light of his experience and successes in producing musicals that yielded him great wealth.
No agreement was signed between the two regarding
the copyright of the parties participating in creating
the musical.
Joseph and Adam began working intensely to
finish writing the musical’s plot in a creative process
that lasted approximately six months. Adam’s contribution was considerable and appreciated by Joseph. Adam was responsible for thickening the plot,
creating sub-characters, and writing a number of
scenes for the musical’s theme song. The relationship between the two was good, and the parties
worked together in close cooperation. Despite the
collaboration, it was clear to Adam that Joseph determines which changes will be implemented to the
plot of the musical, although most of the changes
Adam made were added to the final work.
After the two completed the writing and production of the musical, it became a Broadway success. Five years later, the musical’s theme song appeared in an advertisement that made it an instant hit
131

The students who participated were first given a short explanation in writing about
the joint authorship doctrine and Israeli copyright law (which does not cover ideas,
procedures and methods of operation, mathematical concepts, facts or data, or news of the
day, etc.).
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and grossed Joseph a whopping $300,000. Adam,
who felt that his contribution to the musical and to
the theme song was significant, asked Joseph to recognize him as a joint author in the musical and theme
song. After Joseph refused this request, Adam filed a
lawsuit against Joseph for recognition as a joint author of the musical and theme song.
The participants answered questions relating to the situation
described above to decide what percent of remuneration the secondary author should be granted. Each participant was presented with
one of the following three methods of rights distribution:
A binary decision: either recognize the secondary author as joint author and divide the rights
equally between them (50%–50%) or completely
deny the secondary author’s authorship claim and
grant full rights to the dominant author (similar to the
current American legal system’s method).
A decision between six linear alternatives for
remunerations to the secondary author: 0%, 10%,
20%, 30%, 40%, and 50% (0% means complete denial of the secondary author’s claim, and 50% is to
grant equal joint authorship rights to both authors).
An open-ended questionnaire: the participants could
distribute remuneration between the two authors
without any limitations (between 0% and 50%, according to a participant’s freely made choice).
The second part of the questionnaire aimed to analyze participants’ positions on a presented situation to determine whether uncopyrightable contributions are perceived as eligible for joint authorship status. This was assessed by asking participants to determine what rate of reward should be granted for uncopyrightable contributions, such as an original idea raised in a meeting between two
creators or an extended amount of work providing non-copyrightable historical research.
B. Sample (Data Set)
219 participants answered the research questionnaires. About
two-thirds (63.3%) of participants were law students holding
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bachelor’s degrees (LLB), and the rest (about 28%) were students
earning their Master’s Degree in Law (LLM).132 Only 1.4% of the
participants were qualified attorneys. The participants did not necessarily have any background knowledge in copyright law. However, the questionnaire provided a short primer on copyright law and
the joint authorship doctrine. Because the study dealt with copyright, participants were asked whether they were engaged in any artistic field. A small proportion of the participants (about 9%) engaged in the arts (e.g., poetry, theater, writing, and acting). The age
of participants ranged from twenty to sixty-three, with the average
age being twenty-nine. Finally, 61% of participants were women.133
C. Results
Table 1, below, presents an analysis of the judicial rule regarding
the percentage of remuneration awarded to a secondary author:
Table 1. The effect of judicial rule on the percentage (%) of
remuneration awarded to a secondary author

132

Variables

Average (%)
(Standard Deviation)

Remuneration to secondary
author (all participants in
three groups)

0.91
(0.28)

Group A – Binary choice

0.81
(0.39)

Group B – Linear choice

0.93
(0.25)

In this research, law students were chosen as participants for the empirical study rather
than judges. This is due to the difficulty of accessing and distributing questionnaires among
judges and constitutes a certain limitation to the findings of the empirical survey. For more
information concerning research showing similar biases in judges compared with students,
see SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 258
(Christopher Rogers & James R. Belser eds., 1993).
133
The questionnaires were distributed to students in 2018. Forty-nine participants were
given a binary choice between two alternatives (“all or nothing”), forty-six participants
were given a linear choice between a number of alternatives (0%, 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%,
and 50%), and 124 participants were given an open-ended choice (no limit to their options).
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Group C – Open-ended
choice

0.94
(0.23)

Remuneration rate to
secondary author
(Group B and C)

32.43
(13.52)

203

Table 1 shows that, on average, more than 90% of participants
in the three groups decided to reward the secondary author for his or
her contribution to the joint work. In Group A – binary choice, 81%
of participants decided to reward the secondary author. By comparison, Groups B and C—which have larger choice options—over
93% of participants decided to reward the secondary author with
some or equal rights. This difference is statistically significant.134
Furthermore, the average remuneration rate granted to the secondary author by participants who were faced with choice options
(linear or open choice in Groups B and C) was approximately 32%.
This rate of remuneration reflects the contribution made by the secondary author in the eyes of the participants: significant enough to
receive recognition, yet much less substantial than that of the dominant author’s contribution. These findings illustrate a connection between the judicial rule and the way participants intuitively allocate
the remunerations to the secondary author.
These results also show that when participants face a variety of
alternatives to allocate remuneration, more than 93% chose to
reward the secondary author proportionally to their assessment of
his contribution. However, when faced with more limited choices,
as in Group A, a lower percentage (81%) decided to grant equal
rights to both authors. In other words, in Group A, 19%
discriminated against the secondary author by completely rejecting
his claim as compared to only 7% in Groups B and C.
Table 2, below, presents the analysis of the reward granted for
non-copyrightable contributions:

134

F = 3.838, p <0.05.
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Table 2. The percentage (%) of remunerations awarded to the
secondary author for non-copyrightable contributions
(in all three groups together)
Variables

Average (%)
(Standard Deviation)

Remuneration for
contribution of idea

0.49
(0.50)

Remuneration for
contribution of technical
knowledge

0.57
(0.50)

Remuneration rate –
contribution of idea

8.36
(13.37)

Remuneration rate –
contribution of technical
knowledge

14.57
(16.46)

Table 2 shows that about half of the participants decided to grant
remunerations for non-copyrightable contributions to the joint work,
such as ideas (49%) and historical background (57%). The average
remuneration rate awarded for a historical background contribution
was almost twice the rate offered for contributing ideas (about 15%
compared to 8%).135 This difference is also statistically significant.136
It is surprising that the remuneration rate for an idea is lower
than the remuneration rate for supplying historical background. This
is because in the field of copyright law, there is an emphasis on the
creativity and the originality of ideas that form a copyrightable
work’s foundation.137 It is possible that the idea contribution was
135

Participants were asked to determine what rate of reward should be granted for the
contribution of an original idea raised in a half-hour meeting between two authors.
Subsequently, participants were required to determine the rate of remuneration to be
awarded for providing a non-copyrightable historical background study completed over
approximately twenty-one days of work (a contribution that implied significant investment
of time and effort).
136
t = 4.732, p <0.001.
137
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 42.
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presented in a limited fashion in contrast to the historical background study, which was presented as an extensive three-week effort. Therefore, these findings show that a high proportion of participants chose to reward compensation for traditionally non-copyrightable contributions, such as ideas and historical background.
D. Discussion
The empirical study had two main objectives. The first was examining the relationship between the judicial rule (the number of
remuneration alternatives) and the remuneration rate allocated to the
secondary author. The second was to examine whether participants
perceived a secondary author’s non-copyrightable contributions as
eligible to receive recognition and remunerations in a joint work.
The first part of the study revealed that more than 90% of participants decided to pay remunerations to a secondary joint author rather than reject the claim outright.138 In other words, most participants preferred to grant remuneration to a secondary author rather
than leave him without any economic or moral rights. Comparing
the three groups revealed that, of the participants in the binary
choice group, only 81% decided to reward the secondary author.139
In contrast, in the two groups with multiple choices, over 93% of
participants decided to reward the secondary author with some or
equal rights.140 Thus, when faced with a binary legal rule system,
fewer secondary authors are likely to receive compensation for their
work. Consequently, these findings may indicate that participants
deciding between two options were more cautious in awarding an
equal remuneration rate (50% each) to both the secondary author
and the dominant author. This may be perceived as too high in comparison to the contribution made by the dominant author. Furthermore, participants with a binary choice, as compared to multiple
choices, granted secondary authors higher average remunerations,
likely due to the lack of alternatives for providing lower rewards.
The results clearly demonstrate that the core principle of the judiciary’s method is related to the system of allocation in which

138
139
140

Supra Part III.C., at tbl.1.
Id.
Id.
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copyrights are divided between the dominant and secondary author.
The research may imply that, according to the “all-or-nothing”
model (as implemented in the United States),141 fewer secondary authors will receive any reward for their contributions to a work. This
is so even when the court believes a secondary author is entitled to
some reward. Courts applying the “all-or-nothing” model seem disinterested in granting a secondary author a fifty percent reward,
viewing the share as relatively high in comparison to the dominant
author’s contribution.
The research regarding the second goal—the status of non-copyrightable contributions in joint works—implies that judicial systems should consider proportionally recognizing and rewarding the
secondary author.
In conclusion, this empirical study shows that limiting courts to
a binary legal rule and using the all-or-nothing method that occurs
in the U.S. legal system damages the fair allocation of rights between joint authors. By contrast, a relative and proportional remuneration regime that matches each author’s contribution is a fairer
and more equitable alternative. Importantly, it is one that recognizes
the relative significance of each author’s contribution. Further, recognizing non-copyrightable contributions may lead to more effective allocation of joint author’s copyrights, encouraging cooperation
and creation of new works.
IV. THE PROPOSED MODEL
This Article’s main goal is to suggest an innovative model that
provides a comprehensive, normative solution to the challenges
raised by existing models of the joint authorship doctrine. Further,
this Article seeks to provide greater certainty regarding reward distribution between joint authors. Finally, this Article puts forth a solution grounded in the theoretical and empirical research described
above.142 The proposed model has two primary parts.
First, the proposed model establishes a default principle with a
presumption of sharing that divides ownership interests in a joint
141
142

Supra Part II.A.
See supra Part III.
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work into equal parts, unless otherwise agreed contractually by the
parties.143 A presumption of sharing is designed to incentivize parties to arrange their relations through a mutual agreement. In addition, default principles will lower transaction costs for joint authors
if the parties did not enter into an agreement. Default principles will
also minimize information gaps between joint authors regarding
their rights. Based on the first part of the proposed model, the following clause should be added to the Copyright Act: “In a joint work
with two or more authors, such authors’ rights shall be divided
equally, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties involved.”
The second part will present the proposed model, dividing joint
authors’ contributions into three main categories: the “primary joint
author,” the “secondary joint author,” and the “de minimis contributor.” This division aspires to give joint authors rights and royalties
in a proportional and just manner, namely, by accurately accounting
for each author’s contributions to the final work. This model, which
is based on a structured scale, will help courts and joint authors
accurately assign each author’s portionate contributions through
fixed and cumulative criteria. For example, the model would
consider factors such as the originality, quality, and importance of
an author’s contribution to the joint work.
In general, this scale will help divide joint authors into three
main categories. First, “primary joint authors” will appear at the top
of the scale and are entitled to control and own an equal share of
rights in a joint work. Second are “secondary joint authors” whose
contributions to a joint work are less than that of the other authors,
yet still significant and copyrightable. Here, the secondary author
will be entitled to relative rights within the work, proportional to his
or her contribution. Further, this will be determined by auxiliary
tests at the court’s disposal. Lastly, there are “de minimis contributors,” whose contributions are not protected by copyright. For instance, contributing technological or scientific knowledge, providing criticism, or arranging and editing materials assimilated into a
work would fall within the “de minimis contributor” category. The
de minimis contributor will appear at the bottom of the hierarchy,
143

A different approach that used the equality principle is presented in Jaffe, supra note
4, at 1571–80.
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and his contribution will not entitle him to any ownership over the
joint work. Rather, the de minimis contributor will only receive
credit and, in rare circumstances, a certain percentage of royalties.
The division of contributors into three main categories and the
recognition of uncopyrightable contributions provide a central innovation.144 If courts deny rights to authors for uncopyrightable contributions, then according to the proposed model, such contributions
will still grant credit or, in rare cases, minor rights to the “de minimis
contributor.” This recognition is consistent with the Copyright Act,
which protects the expression of ideas or technical knowledge.145
Further, protecting the rights of those who contribute uncopyrightable contributions to joint works is fair and just.146 Nimmer states that
copyright’s goal of fostering creativity is best served by rewarding
all parties who work together to unite idea with form, and that copyright protection should extend both to the contributor of ideas and
the contributor who fixed the idea into the joint work.147 Kwall similarly added:
The right of attribution and copyright’s joint authorship law are linked at a fundamental level. Specifically, a successful suit for joint authorship enables a
plaintiff to obtain not only compensation, but also
personal recognition from her creative community,

144

Scholar Vaver suggested that contributors who did not “push the pen onto paper”
should be rewarded. See DAVID VAVER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COPYRIGHT,
PATENT, TRADE-MARKS 121 (2d ed. 2011) (“This collaboration [between A and B] has
sometimes not counted as joint authorship unless A’s ideas were independently
copyrightable—a result that promotes certainty but seems harsh. There would have been
no play at all without A’s input. To elevate B’s contribution and entirely discount A’s may
discourage some fruitful collaborations.…Any substantial intellectual contribution to a
work’s composition pursuant to a common design…should, in principle, count as joint
authorship.”).
145
17 U.S.C. § 102(b); see also supra note 6 and accompanying text.
146
See McFarlin, supra note 91, at 741 (“[W]e are not giving the idea-contributor
ownership of her idea. We are simply giving her joint authorship—and thus coownership—of the writing that owes part of its existence to her.”).
147
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 42. In addition, Hugh Laddie wrote, “[t]he law does
not protect a general idea or concept which underlines the work, nor any one fact or piece
of information contained therein. However, a more detailed collection of ideas, or pattern
of incidents, or compilation of information may amount to” a copyrighted work. 1 HUGH
LADDIE ET AL., THE MODERN LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND DESIGN 100 (3d ed. 2000).
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including the right to be publicly acknowledged as
an author of the work created.148
In other words, an author who contributes uncopyrightable elements will not be granted ownership of his or her contribution. Rather, such an author will simply receive recognition for expending
effort toward her “de minimis contribution.” Accordingly, the empirical results of the research show that more than fifty percent of
the participants decided to grant a small share of rights for contributions of ideas and of historical knowledge.
A. “De Minimis Contributor” Justifications
The following section will discuss the principal justifications for
recognizing a “de minimis contributor”—promoting creativity and
acknowledging the moral right of each contributor. This Article will
then discuss the justification for recognizing and distinguishing between different types of ideas.
1. Promoting Creativity
American scholar Melville Nimmer was the first to put forth the
idea of recognizing a minimal contribution as a sufficiently copyrightable contribution to a joint work.149 According to Nimmer, the
goal of copyright law is to promote creativity by realizing the rights
of all who contributed to a work.150 This even includes respecting a
contribution of a word or sentence.151
In the U.S., Nimmer’s model is not the prevailing approach.152
In fact, most courts have rejected it and instead adopted Goldstein’s
more rigid approach.153 Despite the supremacy of the Goldstein approach, courts in the U.S. have repeatedly discussed Nimmer’s
model in cases where joint authorship issues arise.154 One notable

148

Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Attribution Right in the United States: Caught in the
Crossfire between Copyright and Section 43(A), 77 WASH. L. REV. 985, 990 (2002).
149
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 42.
150
Id.
151
Id. (“[A] person must add more than a word or a line to qualify as a joint author.”).
152
Huang, supra note 45, at 677 (“The Goldstein approach is currently the dominant rule
of joint authorship.”).
153
See, e.g., Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1998).
154
See, e.g., Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 659 (7th Cir. 2004).
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case wherein the American court adopted Nimmer’s “minimal” approach is Gaiman v. McFarlane, which concerned joint authorship
of comic book characters.155 There, the court ruled that requiring
independently copyrightable contributions in the case of certain art
forms might lead to an absurd result in which none of the authors
who contributed to the joint work could be considered the author, as
neither contribution was copyrightable on its own.156 The court accepted Nimmer’s approach and recognized the authors as joint authors even though each separate contribution was not copyrightable.157
2. Acknowledging Moral Rights
Preserving moral rights provides another justification for recognizing “de minimis contributors.” It seems likely that contributors
to a joint work would enjoy public recognition for their contributions. Kwall emphasizes the importance of the right to parenthood
as part of a moral right.158 She states that this right is closely related
to the doctrine of joint authorship, especially in the context of attributing joint works to authors who made contributions.159 According
to Kwall, “[t]he right of attribution and copyright’s joint authorship
law are linked at a fundamental level. Specifically, a successful suit
for joint authorship enables a plaintiff to obtain not only compensation, but also personal recognition from her creative community, including the right to be publicly acknowledged as an author of the
work created.”160
Eisenman v. Qimron—commonly known as the Dead Sea
Scrolls Case161—offers one of the most famous and interesting cases
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Id. at 650.
Id. at 661.
157
Id. at 658–59.
158
Kwall, supra note 148, at 986–87.
159
Id. at 990.
160
Id.
161
Civ A 2790/93, 2811/93 Eisenman v. Qimron, 54(3) PD 817 (2000) (Isr.) (translation
is
available
at
https://www.tau.ac.il/law/members/birnhack/DSStransaltion.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8BF7-9H2P]). In this case, Prof. Elisha Qimron joined Prof. John
Strugenel for the purpose of deciphering the scrolls found in the Qumran caves in the early
1950s. Id. at 3. For eleven consecutive years, Qimron was engaged in deciphering the
scrolls, and in that time, he managed to put together a 121-line text in which about forty
156
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addressing moral rights.162 There, the Israeli Supreme Court granted
copyright protection to Qimron, the researcher who deciphered ancient Qimron scrolls. The Court stated the following:
A person is entitled that his name be attributed to the
“children of his spirit.” His spiritual relationship to
these is akin, almost, to his relationship to his offspring. Publication of a work without bearing his
name in ‘the reasonable scope and to the extent’ infringes the moral right of the author.163
In special circumstances, a contribution of technical skill, such
as decipherment or reproduction, may indicate effort, time,
knowledge, talent, and originality as protected expressions of creativity sufficient to confer rights to the contributor.164 Qimron emphasizes the importance of preserving authors’ moral rights, even in
cases where technical contributions include merely arranging and
deciphering, and where there is only a low threshold of creativity
percent of the text was a completion of missing words not written on the fragments of the
scroll. Id. Before Qimron published the deciphered text, his colleague, Shanks, deliberately
published the findings, without Qimron’s consent. Id. The Supreme Court examined
Qimron’s “decipherment work” using the romantic description of the connection between
Qimron and the deciphered text. Id. at 8. Moreover, the Court held that the physical
arrangement of the scroll fragments, the decipherment of the writing, and the completion
of the gaps in the scrolls by Qimron made the collection of scroll fragments a deciphered
text that constitutes a protected copyright work. Id. at 13. The Court’s verdict did not refer
to Qimron’s deciphering work as a simple technical craft but as an original work that had
turned the ancient fragments of the scrolls into a living text. Id. The Court rejected Shanks’s
legal claim that the publication was protected under the fair use claim (research or
criticism) in light of the infringement of moral right of Qimron’s work (who was also
denied the right to be the first to publish the deciphering of the scrolls). Id. at 15–17. The
Court’s verdict criticized the behavior of Shanks and his colleagues who knowingly
violated the moral right of Qimron who had labored for many years and invested a great
deal of talent and effort in deciphering them. Id. at 19–21.
162
For more information, see generally Niva Elkin-Korn, Commentary, Of Scientific
Claims and Proprietary Rights: Lessons from the Dead Sea Scrolls Case, 38 HOUS. L. REV.
445 (2001); David Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Authorship and
Originality, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (2001); Michael D. Birnhack, Commentary, The Dead Sea
Scrolls Case: Who Is an Author?, 23 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.128 (2001).
163
Qimron, 54(3) PD 817, at 20.
164
Martin v. Kogan [2019] EWCA (Civ) 1645, [41] (Eng.) (“It is the skill and effort
involved in creating, selecting or gathering together the detailed concepts or emotions
which the words have fixed in writing which is protected in the case of a literary or dramatic
work, whether the work is one of sole or joint authorship.”).
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and originality.165 Thus, moral rights serve yet another justification
for crediting a de minimis contributor.
3. Recognizing Ideas in a Joint Work
Copyright protection does not extend to ideas or procedures for
doing, making, or building things; scientific or technical methods or
discoveries; business operations or procedures; mathematical principles; formulas or algorithms; or any other concept, process, or
method of operation.166 Although ideas are not eligible for copyright
protection, the expression of an idea may be protected by copyright.167 This is so even though the distinction between an idea and
an expression in copyright law is “notoriously slippery,” meaning it
is a complicated, vague, and complex distinction.168
Ideas are perceived as “necessary building blocks” for the development of human knowledge and, therefore, must remain free as
“breathable air.”169 These perceptions correspond to the utilitarian
approach to copyright law.170 According to this approach, to increase social wealth in the expressive and creative fields, an author’s
reward must be balanced so that he is motivated to continue creating
original expressions, while simultaneously avoiding monopolistic
rights that cause a chilling effect on future authors.171
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Lior Zemer, Moral Rights: Limited Edition, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1519, 1529–30 (2011);
ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS LAW
FOR THE UNITED STATES XV (2010).
166
17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
167
Martin v. Kogan [2019] EWCA (Civ) 1645, at [34] (“Copyright, of course, does not
subsist in mere ideas, but in their expression.”)
168
DANIELA SIMONE, COPYRIGHT AND COLLECTIVE AUTHORSHIP: LOCATING THE
AUTHORS OF COLLABORATIVE WORK 41 (2019).
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ZEMER, supra note 12, at 47 (“Ideas, no matter how valuable or creative, are excluded
from the scope of copyright protection.”).
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See Lior Zemer, On the Value of Copyright Theory, 2006 INTELL. PROP. Q., no. 1, at
55, 57 (“Utilitarian theorists endorse the creation of intellectual property rights in order to
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Mandel, supra note 80, at 342 (“Bare ideas are off-limits to intellectual property
protection because it is crucial that ideas remain available in the public domain for future
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In the current legal regime, a joint author who contributes an
idea, no matter how central and original, will not be recognized as a
joint author if his idea is not fixed or expressed in the work, as required by copyright law.172 The Goldstein approach, adopted in the
U.S., supports the view that a contribution to a joint work should be
independent and copyrightable.173 This approach does not protect
ideas, central as they may be, that an author contributed to a joint
work.174 Contrary to American law, English copyright law does not
require fixation by the author himself or by someone on the author’s
behalf.175 That is, the fixation requirement can also be fulfilled
where another person fixes the work.176 As English scholar Walter
Copinger wrote:
There is no reason of principle why the person who
creates the work and the person who fixes the work
should be the same. The function of creation and fixation are distinct. Copyright protects the effort of the
author, and once he has created and expressed his
work, it is immaterial how his work came to be
fixed.177
Although the prevailing approach in the English courts does not
recognize idea contribution as a sufficient contribution to a joint
work,178 the Cala case serves as an exception.179 As discussed
above, the court held that creative ideas in architectural drawings of
houses contributed significantly to the outcome.180 Therefore, the
172

17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 40; Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1070–71
(7th Cir. 1994).
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This perception may affect future creators’ incentive to collaborate. See McFarlin,
supra note 91, at 706, 747.
175
See, e.g., Martin v. Kogan [2019] EWCA (Civ) 1645, [53] (Eng.).
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Compare Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 3(3), with 17 U.S.C. §
101 (“by or under the authority of the author”).
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GARNETT, supra note 11, at 102–03.
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Martin v. Kogan [2019] EWCA (Civ) 1645 at [34]–[35] (“A mere idea, stripped of
any context, is of course not the subject of copyright.”)
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Cala Homes (S.) Ltd. v. Alfred McAlpine Homes E. Ltd. [1995] FSR 818 (Ch) at 835–
36 (Eng.); Zemer, supra note 3, at 286 (2006) (“This strict approach to contribution is in
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court conferred joint ownership status in the work.181 The English
court recognized the individual who conceived the work as a joint
author and criticized the prevailing view that only those who
“pushed the pen” should be considered a joint author.182
4. Where Does an Idea Begin and End? Distinguishing
Between Different Types of Ideas
In her article, “Speaking to the Ghost,” scholar Leslie Kurtz
sought to define the types of ideas protected by copyright.183 She
discovered a more accurate distinction between ideas entitled to
copyright protection and ideas that remain in the public domain.184
According to Kurtz, despite the difficulty of identifying a single way
to accurately distinguish between ideas, it is necessary that the
courts enumerate criteria for distinguishing between abstract ideas
and more complex, specific ideas (which may be protected by copyright law). Kurtz proposes three factors.185
a) Simple v. Complex
According to Kurtz’s approach, general ideas are similar to primary building blocks that are free for general use and not copyrightable.186 Further protection for the way in which these elements are
combined and arranged may be provided.187 In her view, an idea is
“an atom of meaning.”188 Kurtz notes that the difference between
two people coming up with an idea lies in the way each fills the idea
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Id. at 836.
Id. at 835. See also McFarlin, supra note 91, at 706 (“I believe that this rule—
collaborators who contribute ideas, and ideas alone, cannot be joint authors of
copyrightable works—reflects a fundamentally flawed conception of authorship, one
which ignores the reality of the creative process and prevents artists like Welles from
obtaining the credit and compensation they deserve.”).
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See generally Leslie A. Kurtz, Speaking to the Ghost: Idea and Expression in
Copyright, 47 U. MIA. L. REV. 1221 (1993).
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Id. at 1225; see Edward Samuels, The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law,
56 TENN. L. REV. 321 (1989).
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with details.189 The more details that exist within an idea, the more
that idea should be granted protection under copyright law.190 Under
her approach, although simple ideas are unprotectable, Kurtz believes combining such ideas may render them sufficiently complex
and thus worthy of copyright protection.191
Kurtz claims that protecting simple, basic ideas will harm works
in the public domain and reduce the accessibility of diverse ideas.192
In contrast, a complex idea that contains several simple ideas will
be protected only to the extent to which the simple ideas overlap.193
In other words, copyright protection will not be granted to each basic
idea individually. Rather, protection will only be granted to the “integration” of ideas.194
John Locke’s labor theory of property also supports distinguishing between basic and complex ideas.195 According to this theory,
an author should be granted property rights for the effort and resources invested into a work.196 Therefore, every person would have
property rights over the fruits of his labor, provided this right does
not harm the general good (“no harm principle”)197 and leaves
enough abundance for the welfare of others (“enough and as
good”).198 Thus, the property right is subject to various considerations and interests, including public interest.199 Accordingly,
189

Id. (“The similarity between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s works is more or less
saturated with detail. The greater that saturation, the more appropriate a finding of
infringement.”)
190
Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 1254.
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Id.
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Id. at 1253–54. According to Kurtz, “[g]ranting exclusive rights to a basic, single,
simple idea removes something of size from the public domain. If an author obtains
exclusive rights to a more complex idea, far less is denied to later authors. A complex idea,
which combines a number of simple ideas, takes from the public domain only the small
area in which the simple ideas intersect, and only when this intersection is ordered in a
particular way.” Id.
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JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 303–20 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1967) (1689).
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1 JOHN LOCKE, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, in THE WORKS OF JOHN
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granting protection to simple ideas that serve as a work’s cornerstones is inappropriate and would be detrimental to the art world.
However, granting protection to works that contain complex ideas
will not prevent other producers from using the work or accessing
simple ideas. According to Locke, complex ideas are part of an author’s work.200 Therefore, an author may use simple ideas to create
complex ones in infinite variety.201 As Locke states:
Repeat, compare, and unite them, even to an almost
infinite variety, and so can make a pleasure new complex ideas….[The human mind] has great power in
varying and multiplying the objects of its thoughts
infinitely, beyond what sensation or reflection furnishes it with; . . . it can . . . put together those ideas
it has, and make new complex ones, which it never
received so united.202
Thus, under the labor theory, simple ideas remain in the public
domain because they are part of the natural world.203 On the other
hand, complex ideas created through expending sufficient effort and
labor receive proprietary protection under copyright law.
b) General v. Specific
General ideas tend to be abstract and incomplete compared to
specific ideas that have mental integrity and contain many details.204
Further, general ideas may constitute components of more complex
ideas.205 According to Kurtz, ideas should not be protected if they
do not contain a certain level of specificity.206 In Ibcos Computers
v. Barclays Finance, the court described general ideas:
The true position is that where an “idea” is sufficiently general, then even if an original work embodies it, the mere taking of that idea will not infringe.
But if the “idea” is detailed, then there may be
200
201
202
203
204
205
206

See LOCKE, supra note 196, at 94.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Kurtz, supra note 183, at 1256.
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infringement. It is a question of degree. The same applies whether the work is functional or not, and
whether visual or literary. In the latter field the taking
of a plot (i.e., the “idea”) of a novel or play can certainly infringe – if that plot is a substantial part of the
copyright work.207
Therefore, specific ideas that are rich in detail should receive
copyright protection, whereas general ideas should remain in the
public domain for the benefit of future creations.208
c) Qualitative Characteristic
The third criterion asks whether a qualitative characteristic distinguishes between types of ideas.209 According to this criterion, determining whether it is necessary for an idea to remain publicly accessible—rather than receive copyright protection—depends on the
idea’s level of uniqueness and quality.210 As Kurtz put it:
If an author’s way of looking at things deviates from
the standard, if she chooses an unusual, nonobvious,
abnormal, extraordinary, unnatural way to express
her ideas, she can expect to be protected against a
wider array of imitators and more abstract forms of
coping.211
Like the idea-expression distinction, differentiating between
types of ideas is complex.212 Despite this difficulty, it is possible to
set criteria governing which ideas can remain uncopyrightable and
in the public—they are the general, simple, abstract ideas lacking a
high degree of uniqueness. Such ideas are the building blocks of
works that should remain free for future use. In contrast, ideas that
are detailed, complex, unusual, and unique, are likely protectable
207
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208
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under copyright law.213 In this regard, Lior Zemer provides support
for the protection of complex, detailed, and developed ideas:
Despite the vagueness and difficulties in drawing a
clear line between the protectable components and
the non-protectable components in a copyrighted entity, it seems that there exists a division between what
is capable of being protected and what is not. A general idea can still be separated from a more complex,
detailed, and more developed idea.214
Canadian scholar David Vaver also supports the recognition of
complex and specific ideas in the joint authorship context.215 According to Vaver, if person A provides person B with full ideas for
a play’s plot and person B turns those ideas into a perfect play, the
two authors should be recognized as joint authors.216 In his view,
ignoring the contributor of the idea may prevent future collaborations.217 Vaver argues that an individual who makes a substantial
intellectual contribution to a work’s composition pursuant to a common design should, in principle, count as a joint author.218
Accordingly, the contribution of one author’s idea is no longer
an amorphous idea that infringes third parties’ freedom of expression, but rather an expression that is integrated into the joint work.219
213

Reinforcement of this conclusion is also found in Locke’s labor theory, according to
which a detailed and complex idea in which an author invests enough thought should
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note 195, at 306–07.
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Scholars such as McFarlin and Tomkowicz also support the recognition of ideas in a
joint work. See McFarlin, supra note 91, at 741. However, unlike this Article’s proposed
model, they deviate from the recognition that only substantial ideas constitute the core of
a work. McFarlin proposes to grant recognition in accordance with the “substantiality” of
the idea. See id. at 754–60. Tomkowicz, on the other hand, proposes integrating the laws
of equity into copyright law to recognize ideas. See Robert Tomkowicz, Copyright in
Ideas: Equitable Ownership of Copyright, 29 CANADIAN INTELL. PROP. REV., no. 1, 2013,
at 75, 77. The problematic nature of their proposals stems from the lack of clear boundaries
that will distinguish between a substantive idea contribution and a non-substantive idea
contribution. This ambiguity regarding the “materiality of the idea” may lead to variable
interpretation and many legal disputes.
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The model proposed in this Article seeks to recognize contributions
of ideas that have been integrated into joint works (expressed as
“collaborations”) and should not remain in the public domain. Even
when they do not form the heart of a joint work, contributions of
expressive ideas deserve to be recognized in a proportional manner.220
B. Applying the Model
Application of this model in court decisions indicates its importance and ability to promote the joint authorship doctrine. In the
following three cases, the U.S. courts decided to accept a dominant
author’s claim and reject the other contributors’ claims to a joint
work, even though the secondary authors’ contributions were significant in relation to the final work.
1. The Thomson Case
Thomson v. Larson is one of the most famous cases addressing
the joint authorship doctrine.221 There, the court denied plaintiff
Thomson economic and moral recognition for her work despite
Thomson’s significant and original contributions to the well-known
musical, Rent.222 This case demonstrates that the American legal
system operates in an unbalanced manner.
Applying the proposed model to the facts in Thomson would
lead to a different, more balanced, and just result. Thomson’s contributions demonstrate that she greatly influenced the play with her
significant and original commentary, rewriting of dialogue, advice
regarding the plot, and additions of original elements such as inventing sub-characters that caused a fundamental and radical change in
the plot.223 However, since Thomson did not contribute the same
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“amount” as Larson, and there was no joint intention, she was not
considered a primary author entitled to half the rights of the work.224
Under the proposed model, Thomson would be a secondary author, entitled to relative rights in the joint work for her significant
and original contribution to the play. In addition to economic rights,
she would also be granted moral rights in the play. Further, the relative percentage of rights the court should grant Thomson would be
proportional to the extent of her contribution to the work. This
amounted to rewriting 1,212 out of 2,542 lines in the play, nine percent of which was original text Thomson added alone.225
2. The Ulloa Case
Ulloa v. Universal Music and Video Distribution is another exemplary case that undermines the foundations of the current joint
authorship doctrine.226 Similar to Thomson, the U.S. court rejected
the claim of a composer who had collaborated with another singer
in creating a song.227 In this case, singer Demme Ulloa was present
at a recording studio as a guest of one of the studio’s producers.228
At the time, famous recording artist Jay-Z was working in the studio
to record what would ultimately become a hit song, titled “Izzo
(H.O.V.A.),” from his record, Blueprint.229
Ulloa listened to an unfinished version of the song and began
improvising a central part of the song—the vocal countermelody.230
Jay-Z liked Ulloa’s improvisational addition and asked Ulloa to record it for “possible” use in the final version.231 Because Ulloa did
not sign an agreement formalizing her rights in the song, she filed a
claim for recognition as one of the song’s joint authors, alongside
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Jay-Z.232 The court recognized Ulloa’s significant contribution to
the song but rejected her lawsuit, finding no joint intention to create
the song.233 Again, this decision demonstrates an unrealistic picture
whereby a creator who contributes talent that significantly influences a work, is left without any economic rights and, even worse,
without recognition for her work. Attributing her name as one of the
composers of the song would have likely contributed greatly to Ulloa’s status and success as a musician.
In contrast to Ulloa, application of this Article’s proposed model
would result in a different, more just decision where Ulloa would be
considered a secondary author and granted relative economic and
moral rights. Ulloa’s voice accompaniment provided an integral and
significant part of the song, fulfilling the required factual basis—a
significant and copyrightable addition. The fact that Jay-Z chose to
use her voice rather than the voice of another singer suggests Ulloa’s
unique and original contribution to the song.234
Ulloa contributed to the song spontaneously; she improvised the
vocal accompaniment during her visit to the recording studio.235 Ulloa’s significant contribution stemming from her unique talent and
voice should not have been ignored and left unrewarded. Thus, in
accordance with the proposed model, Ulloa, as a secondary author,
would be entitled to fair economic and moral rights based on her
contribution.
3. The Aalmuhammed Case
Aalmuhammed v. Lee is another example of the foundational issues existing within the joint authorship doctrine.236 In this case, the
Ninth Circuit rejected plaintiff Aalmuhammed’s claim that he
should be considered a co-producer in the famous film, Malcolm
X.237 The court acknowledged that Aalmuhammed contributed to the
Hollywood film’s production, but decided that despite his contributions, he was not entitled to any economic or moral rights as a joint
232
233
234
235
236
237
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producer.238 The court tightened the requirements for joint authorship.239 It added that, to be a joint author, one must exercise “creative control,” specifying that a true joint author is the “mastermind”
who makes decisions regarding the work’s creation.240 Since Aalmuhammed was not one of the film’s main producers, the court held
that he was not a joint author and would not receive economic rights
or credit as co-writer of the film 241
Applying the proposed model to this case, Aalmuhammed
would have been recognized as a de minimis contributor due to his
contributions to the film, including adding sentences from the
Qur’an and assisting in the correct pronunciation of Arabic words.242
Therefore, under the proposed model, Aalmuhammed would be entitled to credit or relative and limited remuneration for his contributions.
The proposed model will incentivize authors to collaborate with
colleagues, knowing that even minimal, uncopyrightable contributions will receive credit. At the same time, the proposed model will
also increase certainty among dominant authors who would no
longer fear litigation or need to demand equal rights to a work.
Moreover, adopting the proposed model will motivate creators to
regulate relationships ex ante through contractual agreements.
CONCLUSION
This Article expands joint authorship debate in copyright law.
This research analyzes the collaborative model (all-or-nothing) at
the core of the joint authorship doctrine and the inconsistent interpretation of the doctrine’s tests to establish that the current joint authorship doctrine does not serve the appropriate balance between the
varying interests that copyright law seeks to achieve.
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This research presents a comprehensive theoretical analysis of
the law and the theoretical literature regarding the joint authorship
doctrine in copyright law. An in-depth analysis of the existing
American and English legal systems shows that reference to the joint
authorship doctrine is not clear-cut, but rather complex and vague.
Courts and legal literature often focus on the question of whether the
author is a joint author, ignoring the widespread intermediate cases
where there are secondary and minimal creators who contribute labor, efforts, energy, and talent to the joint work. Ignoring these contributions undermines the status of the joint authorship doctrine and
the goals and justifications that copyright law seeks to promote.
One of the core problems stems from cases in which there are
power gaps and even a hierarchy of authors. In these cases, a dominant author may take advantage of that position and avoid granting
rights or credit to secondary authors. This occurs particularly in
cases where the parties have not signed an agreement to settle their
relationship. This leads to a phenomenon of unlawful enrichment,
benefitting the dominant author at the expense of the “other” author—one whose contributions are secondary or minor but, at the
same time, may be significant and original.
On the basis of this theoretical analysis and the empirical findings, the proposed model seeks to produce a fairer and more balanced legal outcome in relation to the joint authorship doctrine. According to this model, a default rule will stipulate that a joint author
of a work will hold rights in equal parts unless otherwise agreed.
The purpose of these default rules is to encourage authors to sign
agreements and to firmly settle their relationships, thus avoiding future litigation from arising. In addition, the proposed model divides
contibutors to joint works into three distinct categories: the primary
author, the secondary author, and the de minimis contributor. This
unique and innovative model will provide an optimal and comprehensive solution to the current failures of the present doctrine, contribute to legal certainty, and encourage joint works.
This Article argues that joint authors should receive proportional
recognition for their contributions under the joint authorship doctrine and avoid situations whereby contributions may be entirely
dismissed, as in the current joint authorship doctrine. This innovative model, predicated on the above study’s empirical results,

224

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXII:1

aspires to advance and promote a more distinctive, efficient, and
feasible way to allocate joint authorship rights—by preserving the
incentive for joint authors to create collaborative works and, at the
same time, better reward these authors.

